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Abstract. This paper focuses on the principle of proportionality as a unique technique used in arguing judicial 
decisions dealing with fundamental rights disputes. I will contest that the principle of proportionality offers fi xed 
steps of examination and makes the thought process of the court transparent. With this approach, confl icts of 
fundamental rights cannot be handled as zero-sum games, but as disputes in which it is possible to fi nd a fair 
balance. Furthermore, the principle of proportionality offers a plausible method of controlling the quality of 
judicial decisions. The function of the principle of proportionality can be identifi ed from different perspectives. Its 
formal function is to promote a valid and proper judgment. However, after closer examination one can argue that 
the formal function of the method is to support (a) the justifi ability of the decision, (b) the correctness of the legal 
interpretation, and (c) the transparency of the arguments used. Besides, there are convincing arguments that the 
principle of proportionality has also an important substantive function in (a) offering more effective protection for 
human rights, (b) deepening the values of the rule of law, and (c) strengthening the democratic character of the 
decision-making process by the verifi ability of the judicial argumentation.
Keywords: limitation of fundamental rights, principle of proportionality, verifi ability of argumentation, 
legitimacy of judicial decisions
1. INTRODUCTION
The quality of the reasoning of judicial decisions dealing with fundamental rights is often 
challenging to measure. In most of the cases, there are no single “right” answers in these 
legal disputes due to the fact that even the exact meaning of certain fundamental rights can 
be unclear. However, the principle of proportionality offers a plausible method for courts to 
examine the acceptability of the limitation of fundamental rights in these legal disputes. If 
the method itself and the related steps of examination are clear, the reasoning of the court 
within this framework could be also subject to measurement: one has to compare the 
general requirements related to the method with its use in the case in question.
The requirements related to the methodology of the principle of proportionality are 
precisely described in the jurisprudence. However, it is often unclear as to what the core 
values it promotes are. To understand the related steps of examination and the method itself 
better, it is worth focusing on the role it plays. In this paper I will offer an analysis of the 
function of the principle of proportionality both from the formal and substantive points of 
view. After a closer examination, strengthening the justifi ability of judicial decisions, the 
quality of the legal interpretation behind them and the transparency of the arguments used 
by courts can be considered as elements related to the formal function of the method. As to 
its substantive function, one can argue that it could offer more effective protection of 
fundamental rights, deepen values related to the rule of law and strengthen the democratic 
character of judicial decision-making.
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Understanding the basic functions of the method better enhances its appropriate use by 
courts. More interestingly, it offers the possibility for the interpreter to measure the quality 
of judicial reasoning in fundamental rights disputes in a plausible way.
2. FORMAL FUNCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY: 
CLASSIC APPROACHES EXPLAINED
2.1. Justifi ability
Every fi nal decision on the constitutionality of a sub-constitutional law limiting a 
fundamental right is bound by circumstances which are typical of the judiciary: the case 
must be decided even if it is a hard one1 or there is neither political nor public consensus on 
the issue. Within these circumstances, it is of key importance that the decision be justifi able. 
Justifi ability also has different layers: justifi ability of the constitutionality (legality) of the 
decision, justifi ability of the well-founded nature of the decision, and justifi ability of the 
rational arguments leading to the fi nal decision (instead of subjective intentions).
The judiciary has the right to some discretion when deciding legal disputes, but its 
sphere of action is not limitless. The fi nal decision must be in accordance with the provisions 
of the constitution (or any other legal document protecting fundamental rights). The 
fundamental rights provisions of constitutions are often formulated in a very abstract way. 
However, they also refer (explicitly or implicitly) to the possibility of limitation.2 The 
decision of the court is in accordance with the constitution if it respects the rule of limitation, 
an aim which is achieved by using the steps of examination set by the principle of 
proportionality,3 designed specifi cally for this purpose. It is important to note that as a result 
of the abstract language of the provisions of the constitution, there is no other option for 
verifying the constitutionality of the decision.
Every judicial decision has to be supported by suffi cient reasoning. In some respects, 
legal disputes concerning confl icts of fundamental rights are much more complex than other 
judicial cases, as the norms requiring interpretation are formulated in a very abstract 
language, and in most cases, the confl icting constitutional values are of equal importance.4 
1  According to Davor Šušnjar, hard cases can occur under the following circumstances: (a) 
there is no statute or precedent applicable in the case, (b) legal language is vague, (c) norms are in 
confl ict and it must be decided which one is applicable in a case, (d) it is possible to decide against 
the explicit wording of a provision, (e) the validity of legal rules may be questioned. See Šušnjar 
(2010) 11–12.
2  The possibility of limitation is also specifi ed by the limitation clauses. A typical explicit 
“limitation of limitations” is the protection of the essential content of the fundamental rights. See 
Article 19. (2) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany: “In no case may a basic right 
be infringed upon in its essential content.” The appropriate use of the principle of proportionality can 
have the same (implicit) limiting effect over the limitations of fundamental rights.
3  These are the examination of (a) the legitimate aim, (b) the rational connection between the 
means and the end (suitability), (c) the necessity of the means chosen by the legislator, and (d) the 
proportionality in the narrow sense, i.e. proportionality between the importance of the aim pursued 
and the harm caused by the limitation of the fundamental right. See Barak (2012) 3.
4  Although there are different approaches, for the purpose of this paper it seems appropriate to 
count on the Principle Theory of Robert Alexy. In his view, fundamental rights, as principles, are 
optimization requirements with equal value which gain for the highest possible realization. See Alexy 
(2010) 47–48.
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Within these circumstances, the appropriate use of the principle of proportionality can 
justify the well-founded nature of the decision, as the reasoning is structured and the fi xed 
order of the steps of examination must be respected. It is also important that the relevant 
manner of the arguments used and the coherence and consistency of the argumentation5 is 
verifi able at every single step. The dissenting and the concurring opinions can be evaluated 
in the same way.
The sphere of discretion of the courts does not mean that decisions can be made 
arbitrarily. On the other hand, it is obvious that a judicial decision is not objective.6 This is 
even more visible in legal disputes regarding the limitation of fundamental rights. In these 
disputes, courts often have to rely on abstract and moral values in the argumentation, 
whereas the meaning of these values is defi ned by the courts themselves. The logical 
structure of the principle of proportionality requires coherent use of rational arguments. If 
moral values must be used in the argumentation, they can be introduced in the fi nal stage of 
the examination (proportionality in the narrow sense), evading the risk that the decision is 
grounded on a false premise.
2.2. Legal interpretation
Every judicial decision is based on legal interpretation, however, this aspect becomes more 
emphasized in legal disputes regarding the limitation of fundamental rights. In these cases, 
the abstract language of constitutions needs to be clarifi ed by the interpretation of superior 
courts, the use of the argumentation based on the principle of proportionality calls for an 
overall and careful interpretation of the provisions of the examined legal acts, and the 
methodology of the examination of sub-constitutional laws (i.e. the more precise formulation 
of the principle of proportionality within the given legal system) is the result of the 
interpretation of previous judgments.
Every legal dispute in this fi eld starts with the interpretation of the provisions of the 
constitution related to the affected fundamental right.7 Relevant provisions of the 
constitution need clarifi cation and the scope of the fundamental rights in question must be 
defi ned. The examination based on the principle of proportionality is a framework for both 
aspects of interpretation.
The interpretation of the sub-constitutional law limiting a fundamental right takes 
place entirely within the framework of the principle of proportionality. Identifying the 
legitimate aim of the legal provisions in question is only possible by interpreting the entire 
legal act. Similarly, examining the rational connection (suitability) of the means employed 
and evaluating them at the step of necessity (whether they can be considered the least 
restrictive means) calls for the interpretation of the legal act in the context of the legal 
system as a whole. Evaluating the relationship between the importance of the aim and the 
5  Davor Šušnjar identifi es coherence, consistency, universalizability and defeasibility as main 
principles of legal reasoning. See Šušnjar (2010) 34–45.
6  Regarding the principle of proportionality, David Beatty argues that objectivity can be gained 
by turning matters of interpretation and matters of moral principle into matters of fact. See Beatty 
(2004) 170–171.
7  This aspect is more visible in the case of examination methods containing two main stages: 
“The focus during the fi rst stage of the inquiry rests on the ascertainment whether the scope of a right 
was satisfi ed in order for its protection to be released.” This ascertainment can be grounded on the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the constitution. Regarding the one- and two-stage 
examinations see Schyff (2005) 11–14.
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harm caused by the limitation of the fundamental right in question (proportionality in the 
narrow sense) establishes a link between the interpretation of the constitution and the 
interpretation of the examined legal act.
Constitutions and other legal documents containing provisions on the protection of 
fundamental rights only rarely clarify the methodology of the examination of laws which 
limit fundamental rights.8 The superior courts usually establish their methodology in 
landmark decisions9, which are points of reference in future cases. When there is a need for 
correction, clarifi cation or improvement of the methodology in question, the methodology 
itself (i.e. the specifi c framework of examination of the given court) has to be interpreted. 
In this sense, the use of the principle of proportionality calls for self-correction time after 
time.
2.3. Transparency
In my view, the third formal function of the principle of proportionality is to enhance the 
transparency of the structure of reasoning, the decisive legal arguments and the arguments 
based on moral values. This impact of the principle of proportionality is far more signifi cant 
than the formal requirement of reasoning and the publicity of judicial decisions. Arguments 
based on the principle of proportionality enhance the precise identifi cation of the most 
controversial moral and political questions society has to face, and lead to possible 
constitutional solutions.
The framework of examining sub-constitutional laws limiting fundamental rights is 
fi xed10 in the practice of every superior court. The steps of examination are settled in 
specifi c logical order whereby every aspect of examination is based on the fi ndings of the 
previous one. The transparency and the stability of this framework enhance the possibility 
of verifying the coherence and consistency of the reasoning. If any step in the examination 
is missing or contradicts the fi ndings of the previous one, it would be easy to detect. A 
transparent and stable framework of examination also helps the different branches of 
government to “speak a common language” in disputes concerning fundamental rights.11
8  One example is the limitation clause of the Hungarian Fundamental Law (i.e. the Constitution), 
which entered into force in 2012. The clause, referring more or less to the principles settled by the 
Constitutional Court, contains requirements regarding the possible limitation of fundamental rights, 
which are also a point of reference for examining the constitutionality of limiting laws. See Article I. 
(3) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary: “A fundamental right may be restricted to allow the exercise 
of another fundamental right or to defend any constitutional value to the extent absolutely necessary, 
in proportion to the desired goal and in respect of the essential content of such fundamental right.”
9  See the Wencker decision (BverfGE 19, 342) and the Lüth decision (BverfGE 7, 198) of the 
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Handyside case [Case of Handyside v 
the United Kingdom, 5493/72, (1976)] and the Sunday Times case [Case of Sunday Times v the United 
Kingdom, 6538/74, (1979)] in the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights; the Oakes 
case [R. v Oakes (1986) 1 S.C.R. 103] decided by the Supreme Court of Canada; and (from a different 
perspective) footnote 4 of the Carolene Products decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
[United States v Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938)].
10  This does not mean that the framework could not be clarifi ed or even changed. As shown 
above, this is possible through the interpretation of the methodology itself.
11  In the practice of the Canadian government the examination of laws is also known prior to 
their enactment, (based on the methodology of the Supreme Court) so as to avoid future rulings of 
incompatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. See Hogg (2009) 724.
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Due to the fi xed framework, every step of examination needs separate argumentation, 
and the arguments used should be located in the chain of arguments at their proper place. 
Accordingly, the argumentation is traceable within the steps of examination. One can also 
fi nd which arguments and counterarguments were challenged, which of those were denied 
and which were considered decisive. The transparency of the argumentation pushes the 
court to handle complex and controversial issues with plain and clear arguments.
It can happen that there is no single right answer to the question raised. When the law 
to be interpreted has no clear meaning, or there is no binding legal rule regarding the 
question, it is possible for a court to choose between the possible meanings, or to base its 
decision on moral considerations. The framework based on the principle of proportionality 
always makes these decisions transparent, and leaves open the possibility of denying or 
substituting the arguments leading to these decisions by future rulings. In cases where there 
is no single constitutional solution, the principle of proportionality also allows the court to 
show deference to the legislature. The transparency of the court’s argumentation is important 
in guiding the other branches of government, as it indicates precisely to the legislature the 
issue to be addressed and the constitutional safeguards which limit its sphere of action.
3. SUBSTANTIVE FUNCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY – 
RENEWING THE FOCUS
3.1. Protection of human rights
The principle of proportionality is more than a method. Decisions of superior courts in 
cases related to confl icts of fundamental rights have signifi cant impact on the entire legal 
and political system. One such effect is strengthening the system of protection of 
fundamental rights. This impact can be assessed from different perspectives, including the 
prevention of possible infringements of fundamental rights, offering effective remedy in 
individual cases, and offering appropriate methodology for other fora dealing with 
fundamental rights.
Every legal system has various institutions and proceedings which together build a 
specifi c system of protection of fundamental rights. Within these systems, the role of 
superior courts and constitutional courts is always of key importance, as their decisions are 
points of reference for other fora. If a superior court performs its examination properly, its 
abstract fi ndings relating to the scope, role and nature of certain fundamental rights can 
guide the legislators and other courts to act in a way which respects these particularities. 
The proper examination based on the principle of proportionality ensures the correctness of 
these fi ndings.
Individual cases can also be examined based on the principle of proportionality. In 
these cases the last part of the examination (proportionality in the narrow sense) can be 
more concrete, as the harm caused by the limitation of the fundamental right in the 
individual case can be weighed more precisely against the importance of the aim of the 
legal act in question. From this point of view, the framework of examination based on the 
principle of proportionality improves the effi ciency of the protection of fundamental rights 
in individual cases.12
12  There are also critical opinions of this aspect. Criticizing the balancing stage of the principle 
of proportionality, Stavros Taskyrakis argues “… if constitutional rights protect the same kind of 
interests as those of the government, and if the protection depends on considerations of some kind of 
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Confl icts of fundamental rights can also occur in the practice of other fora. Executive 
and legislative branches of government have a practical reason for examining their own 
legal acts prior to enacting them, as acts which have already been scrutinized will have a 
better chance of standing up to examination by the superior courts. Practical reasons also 
explain why it is worth focusing on the principle of proportionality during the prior 
examination, as this method may lead to the same result as the one found later by the court. 
Even if this aspect seems theoretical, practical examples do exist.13 Avoiding the most 
obvious impermissible limitations of fundamental rights strengthens the stability of the 
system of fundamental rights.
3.2. Deepening the values of the rule of law
The notion of rule of law is inseparable from judicial review. More specifi cally, the 
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany derived the principle of 
proportionality from the Rechtstaat principle.14 Using the method properly also has an 
impact on the rule of law, as confl ict between legal norms can be resolved and the right to 
legal remedy can be more effective. Furthermore, while carrying out the examination based 
on the principle of proportionality, courts can also identify certain substantive values which 
are part of the notion of the rule of law.
A formal collision is caused when legal acts are in contradiction with the provisions of 
a constitution or any other legal document with a priority position. The explicit or implicit 
limitation clauses open the possibility of limiting fundamental rights, and at the same time 
set boundaries to these limitations.15 A content-based examination, which aims to control 
the constitutionality of the limitation, also leads to the solution of the formal norm collision. 
From this perspective, the principle of proportionality offers a plausible method of enforcing 
the primary status of the constitution in cases related to fundamental rights, and also 
improves the consistency of the legal system.
The right to legal remedy is closely connected with the principle of fair trial and the 
rule of law. Taking this into consideration, one can also note that argumentation based on 
the principle of proportionality enhances the effectiveness of the legal remedy. If the 
examination of the legal act in question is made properly, the individual will have the 
chance to seek fair remedy in his or her case.
When examining certain legal acts limiting fundamental rights, courts always interpret 
the context of the case, taking into consideration the special circumstances and the relevant 
constitutional principles. The interpretation of the constitutional principles often leads to 
the decisive arguments of the case. When using the argumentation based on the principle of 
proportionality, courts always have to clarify the meaning and content of the abstract 
relative ‘weight’ given to the confl icting interests, it follows that the protection accorded by the 
Constitution can never be stable… ”. See Tsakyrakis (2009) 468, 470. However, Matthias Klatt and 
Moritz Meister argue that the priority position of fundamental rights over public interests and 
balancing can be combined: “The higher the abstract weight of a right, the more likely it will trump 
competing considerations.” See Klatt et al. (2012) 687, 690.
13  See above note 12 regarding the practice of the Government of Canada.
14  See Schlink (2012) 730.
15  See above note 3 concerning the limitation of limitations.
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principles in order to balance precisely between the confl icting interests. This clarifi cation 
often leads to the expression of the substantive values which formulate the rule of law.16
3.3. Strengthening democratic decision-making
Democratic decision-making is a multi-layered constitutional requirement. From the formal 
point of view it requires democratic legitimacy (rooted in the notion of people’s sovereignty), 
and also values related to the process of decision-making of public authorities: transparency, 
debating competing alternatives, and respect for the minority opinion.17 The practice of 
courts based on the principle of proportionality fosters democratic decision-making in three 
ways. Firstly, it strengthens the legitimacy of the judicial decisions on a substantive basis. 
Secondly, it gives a suffi cient sphere of action for the elected authorities in formulating 
social relations. Finally, it strengthens the system of checks and balances based on the 
notion of separation of powers.
An endless debate exists regarding the authority of the courts to make fi nal decisions 
on essential social relations and liberties of individuals (e.g. questions relating to the 
beginning and end of life, the right to self-defense, etc.). Critics argue that only elected 
legislative bodies should have the fi nal word on these issues, because they bear political 
responsibility to the public. On the other hand, it can be emphasized that a better option is 
for individual state organs to make the decisions, because they consider the law and not 
political expectations. Reasoning based on the principle of proportionality can also 
contribute to a softening of the tensions between democracy and constitutionality.18 The 
structured and transparent framework of argumentation makes the arguments decisive and 
the conclusions verifi able and justifi able. If properly used, the method also pushes judges to 
base their decisions on rational arguments instead of subjective intentions. They also 
evaluate the context of the case, as well as the social and historical circumstances. All these 
factors foster the possibility that politicians and the public will more readily accept judicial 
decisions. One can conclude that the principle of proportionality strengthens the legitimacy 
of judicial decisions on a substantive basis.
In confl icts of fundamental rights, it is also possible that there is no single right 
(constitutional) solution or that the possible solution does not follow from the text of the 
constitution in a compelling manner. Argumentation based on the principle of proportionality 
also promotes the detection of similar situations and encourages the consideration of 
whether there is a need for social consensus on the particular question. In the latter case 
courts can show deference to the legislator, which gives a suffi cient sphere of action for the 
elected authorities in formulating social relations.19 The argumentation of courts can also 
guide legislators to fi nd the proper solutions in this respect.
16  The founding president of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, László Sólyom [referring to 
the Decision 11/1992. (III. 5.)] underlines that “(T)the Constitutional Court has defi ned the rule of law 
as an institution which means more than the mere harmonization of laws and state activities with the 
provisions of the Constitution. It also held that the values and concepts of the Constitution ought to 
penetrate the society itself.” See Sólyom (2000) 28.
17  The concept of procedural requirements relating to decision-making can also be described by 
the notion of deliberative democracy.
18  Evelyne Maes argues that in cases related to the limitation of fundamental rights courts have 
to do two sets of balancing, “[…] fi rstly, between democracy and constitutionalism, and secondly, 
between the two confl icting constitutional rights.” See Maes, E., (2008) 70.
19  The concept of the margin of appreciation known from the practice of the European Court of 
Ajur2.indb   197 2015.09.25.   13:29:19
198 ZOLTÁN POZSÁR-SZENTMIKLÓSY
The mere possibility of judicial review in cases involving fundamental rights is an 
element in the system of checks and balances which improves the judiciary’s ability to 
control the legislative and executive branches. However, a transparent framework of 
examining legal acts based on the principle of proportionality makes the superior courts 
verifi able and accountable as well. From a substantive point of view, this gives a degree of 
control over the judiciary. Besides, due to the fact that judges and politicians can speak a 
“common language” on issues involving fundamental rights, the argumentation based on 
the principle of proportionality can also improve the cooperation between the different 
branches of government.20 Based on these outcomes, the proper use of the principle of 
proportionality can strengthen the system of checks and balances.
The quality of the argumentation of judicial decisions is verifi able when it is based on 
the principle of proportionality. If the method is properly used, the different steps of 
examination form a fi xed, logical order. Due to the structure of the reasoning, the chain of 
arguments is always traceable and value judgments made by courts are transparent. These 
results strengthen the democratic nature of the judicial decision-making process. This is a 
good reason why it is worth learning how to use the method in an appropriate way.
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